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COURT OF APPEALS, 1957 TERM
raised by the Workmen's Compensation Law,10 were sufficient to offset the Appel-
late Division's ruling, as a matter of law, that the employment was so unrelated"
to and remote from New York that the Workmen's Compensation Board had no
jurisdiction."
Timeliness of Application
Hengel v. Federici'2 was concerned with the length of time within which a
claim for reimbursement from the Workmen's Compensation Special Disability
Fund must be filed. The statute sets forth 104 weeks from the date of the dis-
ability as the time limit within which an employer must file in order to receive
reimbursement.1 3 In the instant case the Workmen's Compensation Board errone-
ously established August 22, 1947, as the date of the injury rather than April 15,
1947, the actual date of the employee's injury. Claim for reimbursement was not
made by the employer's insurance carrier until June 22, 1949, but the carrier
claimed that it should not be barred from reimbursement because of the Board's
erroneous original determination. Without deciding whether under other circum-
stances the failure to file within the 104 week period might not preclude reim-
bursement, the Court disallowed the carrier's claim because the carrier had ample
notice of the date of actual injury, and the Board's erroneous determination in no
way affected the carrier's notice of the correct date.
Scope of Employment
A. In Miller v. Bartlett Tree Expert Co.,'4 a supervisory employee in the
tree surgery business was directed by his employer to attend an annual conference
which included both daytime and evening sessions. While working outside during
an afternon session, claimant became dirty due to the handling of soil. As he
was preparing to attend the evening session, he slipped in the shower, incurring
an injury.
The Court held (5-2), without citing any authority, that the injury was
compensable. The Court reasoned that, since his presence and participation were
commanded by his employer at both day and evening sessions and the shower'
was taken between the two sessions, it "necessarily" arose out of and in the course
of his employment0 5
10. N. Y. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAw, §21 provides that:
In any proceeding, there is a presumption that the claim
comes within the provision of the chapter which can be
rebutted by substantial evidence to the contrary.
11. Nashko v. Standard Water Proofing Co., 4 N.Y.2d 199, 173 N.Y.S.2d 565
(1958).
12. 4 N.Y.2d 176, 173 N.Y.S.2d 291 (1958).
13. N. Y. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAwV §15(8).
14. 3 N.Y.2d 654, 171 N.Y.S.2d 77 (1958).
15. N. Y. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAV §10.
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The dissent argued that the taking of a bath was an act of personal hygiene
and should not be compensable. It pointed out that compensation was denied a
salesman who was injured while showering after he had set up a display in his
hotel room.1' Compensation was also denied a claimant who injured her eye while
combing her hair as she was prepiring to go to lunch.1" However, these cases may
be distinguished from the instant case in that they concerned acts of a purely
personal nature, not caused by the employment. In the instant case, the very nature
of the work caused the claimant to become dirty and the showering was necessary
in order to continue his job.' 8
B. In Pasquel v. Coverly,19 another case concerning scope of employment, a
bookkeeper was sent by his employer to a branch office seventy-seven miles away,
for the day. After finishing work for the day, at about 5:00 pam., he drove to a
relative's home for dinner. In the evening, he and a friend went shopping for a
car and then proceeded to a tavern where they had "several" drinks. They then
returned to his relative's home where they played cards until 3:00 am., when he
left for home. He was killed when his car went off the road at about 5:30 am.
about one mile from his home. There was no evidence of any defect in the
deceased's car.
The Court held (5-2) this death to be non-compensable as "the trip lost its
identity as part of the decedents employment" and thus did not arise out of the
scope of his employment 20 The majority reasoned that the risks created by the
deviation were operative in producing the accident. Thus the trip was materially
different than if he had traveled home without spending the night in personal
activities of this nature. The deviation "will weigh heavily on the side of non-
compensability" where it was operative in causing the accident.2' One does not
re-enter his employment after deviation merely because he returns to the usual
route.
In the Van De Carr22 case, the deceased had been returning home from
business on his usual route when the accident occurred. He had deviated from
his territory earlier and had had a few drinks. The Court held that the deviation
so contributed to the accident that death was non-compensable.
It is well established that if the deviation is operative in causing the injury,
16. Davidson v. Pansy Waist Co., 240 N.Y. 584, 148 N.E. 715 (1925).
17. Schultz v. Nation Associates, 281 App. Div. 915, 119 N.Y.S.2d 673 (3d
Dep't 1953).
18. See Sexton v. Public Service Commission of the City of New York,
180 App. Div. 111, 167 N.Y. Supp. 493 (3d Dep't 1917).
19. 4 N.Y.S. 2d 28, 171 N.Y.S.2d 848 (1958).
20. N. Y. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAw §10.
21. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAw §19.61 (1952).
22. 282 App. Div. 902, 124 N.Y.S.2d 833 (3d Dep't 1953).
COURT OF APPEALS, 1957 TERM
than the trip will be deemed to have lost its identity with the employer's business
and the injury will be held noncompensable. This identity theory quoted from
the lower court's dissent is no more than the causality test applied by the majority.
The theory questions the causal relation between the deviation and the accident.
The dissent based its decision solely on the legislative directive that "the
decision of the board shall be final as to all questions of fact."23 The Court may
overrule the Workman's Compensation Board as a matter of law, but where the
issue is a debatable question of fact, the decision of the board is final.24
The majority and the dissent do not differ as to the law or the test, but
merely as to the causal relation between the deviation and the accident. The
majority held that reasonable men could not differ as to the causal relation between
the two, while the dissent believed that they could.
23. N. Y. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAw §20.
24. Simmons v. Otis Elevator Co., 268 App. Div. 808, 4 N.Y.S.2d 563 (3d
Dep't 1944).
